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The paper analyses the Treuhandanstalt's privatization
approach by putting it in a public choice perspective.
It comes to the conclusion that the Treuhandanstalt
had been very successful in reaching its economic and
social targets. Economists might worry that the Treu-
handanstalt's operation had accumulated too much
waste caused by social considerations. And politicians
might lament that its strategy implied that millions of
people were ,,outplaced" or ,,downsized" in the name
of privatization. But in terms of the interaction of
economics and politics the Treuhandanstalt's perform-
ance had not been so far from the optimum.-1-
,,When you have an economy, you have
goods and services. When you have politics,
you have laws and statesmen. However,
when you put the two together, you ain't got
nothing."
Steve Magee
I Introduction: Privatization as an Instrumental Choice
Some years' ago, privatization was the creed of politicians in all transition countries. At
that time everybody was convinced that selling state-owned companies would be the
best way to transform them for better. Meanwhile, privatization has lost its fade. It has
become an awkward albatross unable of a speedy take-off and a soft landing. Only in
the Czech Republic transferring ownership proceeded smoothly. In other countries,
however, it is behind schedule. In Hungary, sales have been completely blocked since
last year's elections. In Poland it is hoped that the so-called mass privatization program
(MPP) could breathe new life into the privatization process. But the complexity of the
MPP holds many dangers. There are still enough possibilities for politicians of delay-
ing it.
On the other hand, politicians cannot delay decisions to a never-never day. Privatiza-
tion or non-privatization is also an instrumental choice in public finance. It is not pos-
sible for governments to keep unprofitable companies in the public sector, whatever
the costs for the taxpayers. Sooner or later this strategy will become too costly, and
thus also suboptimal in terms of political economy.
The paper was presented at the conference ,,Privatization in Poland and East Germany: A
Comparison", held in Tutzing from 17-20 May 1995. Very helpful comments to the draft
were provided by my colleagues Birgit Sander and Uwe Siegmund and by the participants
of the conference.-2-
The crucial question is: what has made privatization so unpopular with politicians and
voters? The answer is simple: while economists tend to debate on privatization in an
abstract way, politicians and ordinary people face an existential problem. As Jan
Winiecki (1992, p. 71) pointed out, privatization as part of the transition to the market
is a major political, not an economic change". Even in western countries conservatives
do win elections not because but in spite of privatization.
There is obviously a trade-off between economic and political efficiency: economic
agents make all efforts to maximize their economic welfare, while politicians take all
actions to maximize their electorate welfare (Magee, Brock, Young, 1989). The focus
of economic agents is allocation, that of political party leaders is distribution. How-
ever, maximizing both economic aad political efficiency is impossible. The conse-
quence is that governments frequently choose a policy of second best (or second
worst), which is economically and politically equally inefficient.
This paper examines the Treuhandanstalt's (THA) privatization approach by putting it
in a public choice perspective. It argues that the THA was permanently on a tightrope
walk between economic and political privatization. The ,,Treuhandgesetz" (Law on
Privatization) listed the transformation of ownership as only one of the explicit targets.
The THA was also required ,,to create in as many companies as possible the ability to
compete". This legal provision became a wide-open gateway for political intervention.
Although the THA's team was strongly committed to privatization and did its best to
resist political pressure, its decisions could not be free of ambiguity. Many of its deci-
sions reflected a delicate political equilibrium that balanced conflicting interests of the
groups involved. As a consequence, the THA's strategy undoubtedly has some short-
comings in terms of economic efficiency. Nonetheless, governments in transition
countries might learn from it. They will also find many pluses. Rational policy means
making a good choice. The lessons from the THA's approach may be moderately help-
ful in advising on the best choice possible.-3-
II Some Critical Issues: Political versus Economic Privatization
1 Targets of Privatization . , ,.
/ • . ,"'".T
: •:;.•: •'.
Perhaps the clearest lesson from the German experiences is that it is necessary to con-
sistently define the targets of privatization. The crucial point of any political equilib-
rium model is that allocative and distributive targets often overlap. For politicians in
transition countries the ,,fair" distribution of people's property is an essential require-
ment. At a first glance, the distribution of vouchers seems to be just the thing. But in
fact, a long debate over this instrument has raised some doubts. It has rather delayed
than accelerated the privatization process in most countries — last but not least in Po-
land. Obviously, the voucher privatization is far from being politically efficient.
It goes without saying that voucher privatization is not the best choice in terms of eco-
nomic efficiency. From the Coase theorem we can learn that allocative efficiency does
not depend on the distribution of property rights. The initial distribution may affect the
allocation of capital but not the efficiency of capital allocation. What matters is that
the property rights are effectively enforced (Vaubel, 1992).
It was an invaluable advantage that the THA could neglect distributional considera-
tions. It was not obliged to realize suitable proceeds from the sale of companies and
other assets. On the contrary, it had a soft budget constraint which allowed even huge
losses.
2 In retrospect, it was fortunate that the privatization process was not overlapped
by a debate on the distribution of ,,people's property". Given the enormous costs of pri-
vatization and restructuring of THA companies, vouchers would have become a source
of severe disappointment and political discontent.
The Achilles heel of the THA was not a conflict between efficiency and equity but be-
tween privatization and restructuring. The law stated clearly that the state-owned com-
2
According to the THA Law possible proceeds should be used for compensating for the
,,losses" of East German savers caused by applying a conversion rate of 1:2 (rather than
1:1) for parts of savings deposits.-4-
panies should be ,,privatized as quickly as possible", but also ,,put into conditions to be
fit to compete". However, the law did not fix any hierarchical relationship between the
two targets. Consequently, it was never clear which target should be considered to be
more important. The THA was permanently criticized to emphasize privatizing rather
than restructuring. It was argued that both should be considered as complementary tar-
gets and not as alternative ones. Actually, the protagonists of a pre-restructuring strat-
egy were often interested in stopping or delaying the speed of the privatization and not
in increasing it. The great majority of companies owned by the THA was heavily
overmanned and could not be brought to the market without a huge decline in staff.
Often a local anti-privatization coalition of workers, unions, churches, state govern-
ments and municipal administration came in being ready to block any privatization if
their interests were not adequately taken into consideration.
Under these conditions the THA was pursuing a privatization strategy which focused
not only on the target but also on the route to the target. Its basic line for privatization
was to preserve a company as far as possible. The THA therefore required potential
investors to offer a business concept in which they could convincingly demonstrate
that they were able to continue the operation of the company with a good hope of suc-
cess. The term ,,continuation" was interpreted very narrowly, to mean retaining the
main emphasis on the business and its location. This greatly restricted the range of
possibilities for privatization. Generally speaking, a potential investor was considered
unsuccessful if he intended to turn the company to some other use or re-sell it. The
THA thus assumed (not always on any firm basis) that the investor intended to carry
out his project somewhere else if he was turned down. It is without any doubt difficult
to justify this fixation with the preservation of companies and production locations on
any economic grounds. As the THA itself has conceded, it could be that an investor of-
fering a better strategy was turned down. In the words of its lady President, the strat-
egy was not selling companies but purchasing investors: ,,We are purchasing: ... we
give preference to a buyer if he is contributing sales channels, if he can close the inno-
vation and technology gap ... as quickly as possible and thus enable the company to
survive" (Breuel, 1992). The THA was thus attempting to prevent privatization leading
to asset-stripping, which could result in serious regional employment problems, and-5-
was therefore prepared to make concessions against its final targets if it could thereby
more readily attain its intermediate targets. The consequence of this was that it was not
pursuing privatization in accordance with any rigid set of rules, but was keeping its
options open.
While a private seller of a company is normally interested in maximizing his proceeds
and in putting himself out of business and responsibility, the THA had been forced to
ensure that its targets were reached. In contrast to normal acquisition contracts the
crucial matter was generally not the selling price. As an institution with ,,deep pockets"
it was able to sell companies even at a negative price. However, in this case it can ex-
pect that the investor will hold what he has promised. The THA, therefore, had made
great efforts to clarify the essentials of the contracts before they were signed. Although
the THA's acquisition contracts are considered as lean by international standards they
comprise all those issues which really matter: clauses regarding the continuation of the
company, employment and investment guaranties, revaluation of assets — and finally
the purchase price. Most of these clauses are not customary in normal acquisition con-
tracts (Schmidt, 1994).








The typical THA contract had been based on a few cornerstones reflecting the THA's
economic and social targets.
The main target was business continuation. The THA had an outstanding interest
to enforce an investor's commitment with regard to keeping the company running.
The trauma to be avoided was the destruction of a company that wants to tear out
the surplus value lying within. However, in certain cases the THA faced a di-
lemma: it was not just selling the ,,jam", but mainly selling ,,bread and butter"
companies, many of them stale and mouldy enough to be suitable for bankruptcy.
Often the company was more worth dead than alive. Then the THA had no
choice. It had to put its hands in ,,deep pockets". This is one of the reasons why
the THA's privatization strategy caused huge losses: many companies were sold
at a negative price.
Moreover, the THA did not only stipulate a company's future business program
but also important strategic variables such as employment and investment. Prin-
cipally, the THA was interested in contracting high employment and investment
obligations, and it often paid a high price for it. There was a trade-off between
the number of jobs and the amount of investments to be obtained and the pur-
chase price agreed.
- Compared to the other goals the purchase price, which is normally the essential
in acquisition contracts, played only a minor role. It was frequently determined
by the investor's promises rather than by the value of the company's assets. >
It goes without saying that the THA was interested that the investor held what he had
promised. The THA pumped a lot of money into the companies. As a consequence, it
was obliged to do its best to safeguard what it had reached in lengthy negotiations with
the investor. The typical acquisition contract is fully crammed with warranties. Now,
after closing its privatization shop at the end of 1994, it was forced to open another
one, for contract management and controlling in order to ensure that contracts are kept.
By that the THA must accompany ,,its" companies for a long time.-7-
Although the privatization of a state-owned company is presumably the most effective
form of restructuring, it does not guarantee its survival. like any other company, it can
fail if its new owner is not up to the job. The THA had a clear preference for taking its
line from the investor's corporate strategy when reaching privatization decisions: the
business concept was the A and O in negotiations, not the purchase price. However, a
business concept is not an objective basis for taking decisions. It leaves a huge scope
for subjective judgement to the side of carrying out privatizing. It rests on the assump-
tion that the THA would be omniscient. In this respect, its privatization strategy mir-
rored the old socialist system of central planning (Schatz, 1992). If a number of bid-
ders submit totally different strategies, the choice often becomes difficult. The pur-
chase price, in contrast, is an objective measure. An investor who offers a price higher
than that offered by any other bidder has usually the best corporate strategy, as he will
risk good money if he can actually expect an appropriate return on it.
From the point of view of a company continuing business as well as preserving or
creating jobs and undertaking investments are not reasonably economic objectives.
First of all, a company should make profits. Therefore, privatization must keep a com-
pany free from such tasks which interfere with its true task. It is no surprise that more
and more privatized firms, as it turns out that their business cannot flourish as fast as it
was expected, consider the employment and investment obligations as a fetter.
Undoubtedly, in this respect the THA became an instrument of industrial and employ-
ment policy. This is — under the aspect of economic efficiency — the weak point of
its privatization strategy. On the other hand, it was perhaps the price to be paid for
political feasibility. The political economy cannot be in an equilibrium without a posi-
tive message. ,,Privatization" is obviously not a positive message, but ,,privatization
creates jobs" is one.
As Anthony Downs (1957) pointed out, the rational voter is the ignorant voter who is
only imperfectly informed. He or she can be easily manipulated by obfuscation
(Magee, Brock, Young, 1989). Politicians can successfully propagate a bad policy as
long as the deficiencies are not detectable by voters. In some respect the THA strategy-8-
was fully in line with the principle of optimal obfuscation: the THA could serve up a
palatable lunch without presenting the bill. This will come later.
In this respect the tactics rather than the targets in the privatization process raise many
doubts. The THA has always endeavoured to find widespread political support for a
quick privatization. In this way many companies have been kept alive with no other
purpose than to keep workers employed. Whatever may be said in favour of these tac-
tics, they have nothing to do with the primary target of the THA to create viable firms
by privatization. Such an allocation to less efficient investors will be corrected, sooner
or later, by the market — or, if politicians resist, continued subsidies will be necessary.
The lessons from all this are that a multiple system of targets which tend to contradict
one another may be politically very efficient in terms of optimal obfuscation. Provided
there are sufficient resources, politicians can sponsor a policy which particularizes
benefits but generalizes costs. However, there is no doubt that the results are deeply
unsatisfactory under the aspect of economic efficiency.
2 Responsibility for Privatization
Although the THA had not been established as a holding by law, it became the only
owner of companies. This status proved an invaluable advantage in the privatization
process. Neither the government nor the companies themselves were directly involved.
Responsibility rested solely with the THA.
It is not possible to protect privatization against the demagoguery of the political de-
bate. It is also not possible to shield an independent privatization agency from political
pressure. However, an independent institution is better qualified to cope with the issue.
Experience in Poland and Hungary has shown that tactical games of political parties,
self-management boards and trade unions might easily block even the most convincing
privatization strategies. Privatization needs a ,,lightning conductor", and the THA had
been that institution which was ideal for venting anger on it.-9-
Legally, the THA was a curiosity. It was neither an official authority nor a holding
company. It was, so to speak, sailing in a no-man's land between politics and economy.
In some respects it was comparable with the Deutsche Bundesbank; for the former
chancellor Helmut Schmidt it was simply the ,,side-government east" (Czada, 1993).
But in fact, the THA had only limited autonomy at its disposal. It was financed by the
federal ministry of finance, co-administered by the ,,Verwaltungsrat" (,,management
trust"), whose members represented different political groups, ,,guided" by numerous
advisory committees and, last but not least, controlled by the parliament. The THA's
independence stemmed to a great extent from the reputation which it gained under the
sound but forceful leadership of its long-standing lady president Birgit Breuel.
From the perspective of the public choice approach a privatization agency established
in the no-man's land between politics and economy comes perhaps close to an endoge-
nous equilibrium. In such an equilibrium none of the players can reach a maximum.
Every player has to calculate the decisions of the other players in response to his own
decision (Magee, Brock, Young, 1989). It is true that the THA had to calculate the
constraints imposed by the lobby, but the lobby itself had also rationally allocated its
resources in response to the decision of the THA. Just because the legal construction
of the THA was permanently criticized by pressure groups, it was obviously the right
one.
3 Forms of Privatization
In principle, two basic models can be used for privatization: the auction model and the
bargaining model (Schmidt, 1993).
- Using the auction model, a company is sold to the highest bidder. The criteria for
selection can be combined in any required manner: the highest offer price, the
most convincing corporate strategy, the highest number of jobs promised, or a
combination of all of them. The auction model is favoured by most theoretical
economists (Smith, 1991).-10-
- Using the bargaining model, bilateral negotiations decide which bidder is to be
successful. The procedure is always recommended by economists when no per-
fect market exists, e.g., when only a small number of bidders appear or are al-
lowed to appear.
However, each of the two models has, admittedly, some further advantages and disad-
vantages. For instance, the question has to be asked as to which model will lead to the
best possible valuation of the company and thus a good selling price. In this respect the
auction model is superior to the negotiation model, on condition that competition be-
tween the bidders exists.
The THA was basically free in its choice of privatization instruments, but in fact the
choice was determined by the targets it was striving to attain, as its interests were not
to find ,,any" buyer, but the ,,right" buyer, one who was willing and able to restructure
a run-down company and continue its operations. In most cases it decided in favour of
a flexible approach which was officially labelled as ,,industry-oriented marketing".
Actually, the THA was very innovative in developing adequate privatization proce-
dures which, however, cannot be adequately evaluated within the small scope of this
paper. Apart from the mass privatization in the retail and catering trade where fixed
procedures were employed, it nearly always regarded the sale of a company as a
unique event. In some cases it also tied up a ,,package" and endeavoured to privatize
more than one company at a time in each tender. This was the case especially in prob-
lem industries (steel, chemicals, ship-building and micro-electronics), where the cru-
cial point was the preservation of existing industrial networks.
For the privatization procedure the THA generally applied minimum standards, con-
taining the following major points among others: calculation of value, sales negotia-
tion, sales decision, and contract formulation. Apart from this, however, the privatiza-
tion teams were given plenty of free scope in their handling. This has been seen by
many as an important shortcoming since this took a major proportion of the decision-
taking process out of the range of public supervision. But the THA attributed at least
part of its success in privatization to this regulation. Actually, the lack of transpar-
ency — the THA reached most of its decisions behind closed doors, and it is hard to-11-
check up on them — was optimal in terms of obfuscation. By that, the THA was vir-
tually outside of public control.
Public choice theory suggests that it is harder for voters to detect the deficiencies of an
indirect rather than of a direct policy. The THA sold a huge number of companies at an
extremely low or even negative price. But in this respect it was seldom penalized by
public opinion. As the THA did mostly focus on non-price considerations such as em-
ployment-level maintenance and further capital investment agreements, the distributive
elements of its approach remained largely undetectable.
4 Costs of Privatization
Since mid 1990 the THA has pumped a lot of money into the eastern German econ-
omy. The privatization of the ,,people's property" is expected to make a profit of
roughly 70 billion DM, but this figure has to be set against the expenditures incurred
during the course of privatization which will total about 340 billion DM. As a conse-
quence, a net loss of 270 billion DM has to be transferred to the state budget.
Blame for the fact that the privatization of companies would deeply end up in the red
is not only to be laid at the THA's door, not even the major part of it. The deficit is
principally attributable to the mismanagement of the old socialist system, which
drained companies of their financial lifeblood. However, the question needs to be
asked as to whether the deficit shown in the profit-and-loss account might not have
been smaller if the THA had devoted its efforts exclusively to its privatization task
rather than having to fulfil obligations under structural and social policy as well. In
fact, the size of these deficits results from the THA placing far greater weight on other
targets in its negotiations, particularly the preservation of jobs, rather than on the
maximization of proceeds.
An investigating committee of the Federal Parliament, initiated by the opposition parties,
has come to nothing. The THA has been very successful in withholding information from
the committee.-12-
The THA was meant to realize a positive amount as the proceeds of its privatization
sales, but was also allowed to sell at a loss if the privatization was thus achieved more
quickly and successfully. Actually, it enjoyed a soft budget constraint. There were nu-
merous early warnings against doing it (Maurer, Sander, Schmidt, 1991; Hax, 1992).
By that, so it was argued, the THA was able to prolong the survival of bankrupt com-
panies which had better been liquidated in the first place. A limited budget, on the
other hand, would have forced the THA to concentrate on companies with a good
chance to become viable.
However, it is unlikely that the THA would have been able to liquidate the majority of
,,hopeless cases" and after that close its shop. Presumably, it would still be alive as a
holding for some hundred companies continuously depending on subsidies. In this re-
spect the THA faced only a trade-off between high costs of privatization and high costs
of long-term subsidization. There are good reasons to believe that a once-and-for-never
subsidy in the form of a low or negative selling price had come much cheaper than a
permanent subsidy. According to this the THA approach has not only been politically
but also economically efficient as it has minimized the costs of subsidization.
5 Results of Privatization
The THA was able to close its shop at the end of 1994. Within 4
 xh years it had privat-
ized or liquidated more than 13,000 companies (a rate of 10 per day) which is un-
doubtedly an impressive success story. Nevertheless, the THA has invested a lot of
money in getting its targets realized. Time must tell whether the results make all these
efforts worthwhile.
Meanwhile the THA has opened another shop, the ,,Bundesanstalt fur vereinigungsbe-
dingte Sonderaufgaben" (BVS) which has to take care that contracts are kept. At pre-
sent, the BVS data base includes approximately 50,000 contracts which have to be
controlled and managed for a long time. Initially, the THA regarded the examination of
contracts as its foremost task. But soon it realized that it would be necessary to focus
on the field of contract management because a large number of contracts were poten-
tial candidates for re-negotiations or, if worst came to worst, for bringing defaulting. 13 - ?bHO^Ov '"'•'--( -"V-r- ',-,•<
investors to court. Consequently, the BVS must consider its task in a broader sense: as
a permanent management of risks involved in the contracts.
It is still too early for a final judgement. The period of validity of contracts often cov-
ers several years, and most investors are free with respect to timing their obligations.
Only a minority of companies has already set up in the market. A large number is still
facing difficulties and will fail sooner or later. According to information obtained from
the BVS, in February 1995 a total of 3,000 re-negotiations (4,000 objects) were regis-
tered of which 2,500 contracts (3,400 objects) could be concluded. Only 20 percent of
re-negotiations were scheduled in the contracts, 80 percent were initiated by the inves-
tor or the THA and its successor, the BVS. Obviously, more and more investors ask for
re-negotiations because of financial difficulties.
The crucial point is: the BVS cannot force an investor to keep the contract whatever
the costs may be. It must be, in principle, ready to re-negotiate. The BVS's main con-
cern must be the healthy future of the company. This is not promoted if the investor is
condemned to pay a fine — and, as a consequence, goes bankrupt. One of the spec-
tacular cases is that of the Markische Faser AG which got into serious trouble imme-
diately after privatization. ( A description of its unsuccessful privatization is given in
the Annex).
Penalties can only work by the same principle as traffic regulations do: they should
take care that the necessary steps are taken. By threat of punishment it is hoped to hold
the number of offenders low.
Nevertheless, the BVS feels rather unhappy with applying this instrument: until now it
has only taken about 100 investors to court, but it is estimated by BVS's officials that
another 700 or 800 may follow. ,,On the practical side it has become apparent that
fixing the level of such penalties is rather like walking a tightrope: a balancing act be-
tween the economic benefits to be gained thereby and the danger of frightening off po-
tential investors" (Baumgarten, 1992, p. 286). In fact, the typical THA contract with its
specific safeguard clauses shifts an incalculable risk onto the investor. An employment-14-
and investment guaranty may easily become a time bomb. The BVS cannot be inter-
ested in letting it go off.
Therefore, the BVS hesitates to take a sledgehammer to crack a nut. It prefers other
measures instead of imposing a fine. An adequate measure is to raise the purchase
price subsequently. From the legal point of view raising the purchase price is easier to
handle than enforcing a penalty (Wachter, 1994).
Although the THA focused its sales strategy on finding investors able to give the com-
pany a secure future, inevitably a great part of them must fail. In many cases the busi-
ness concept proved to be unable to carry the load. The new owners often miscalcu-
lated their possibilities to run their company successfully. They overestimated the cash
flows and, accordingly, the net asset value of the company. Frequently, these difficul-
ties have a strong connection with the collapse of exports to the former CMEA coun-
tries. Initially, many West German and foreign investors expected to get rapid access
to the eastern markets by purchasing a THA company but this strategy did not work
out. Investors who failed their targets will hardly be able to pay a penalty.
There is an ongoing discussion between the BVS on the one hand and investors and
their attorneys on the other as to whether a vital change in circumstances assumed by
the parties at the time the contract was concluded could be an argument for
re-negotiating the contract. In principle, the BVS is willing to talk about a reduction of
the purchase price or the penalty, but not about a repurchase of the company. How-
ever, some jurists consider many of the contract clauses (such as business continua-
tion, employment and investment clauses) to be not ligitable according to the German
law.
The THA has been very proud that — on average — the employment and investment
targets were surpassed: in 1993, e.g., about 9,200 contracts with employment guaran-
tees were examined. 596,000 jobs were maintained or created instead of 520,000 guar-
anteed. However, 1,650 investors did not reach their employment targets: they pro-
vided only two thirds of the jobs they promised. Similar results were reached in respect
to investment guaranties: in 1993, nearly 2,500 contracts were controlled of which-15-
2,000 surpassed and 470 failed the targets. On average, 19 billion DM were invested
instead of 15 billion DM guaranteed (Tables 1-3).






1990 | 1991 1992 1993 1994
Employment commitments (number)
25,565 411,989 778,468 919,236 974,389
8,203 258,700 580,368 708,560 760,862
Investment commitments (mill. DM)
11,725 41,450 88,043 106,399 142,463
175 13,494 54,828 71,433 107,117
Source: THA/BVS.
Table 2 - THA Contracts under Examination 1990-1993
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| 1991 1992 1993
Number of examined contracts
131 770 2,489





























Table 4 - THA Contracts under Examination 1993











































Nevertheless, for many investors the employment and investment obligations are a
high hurdle. It is interesting enough that of those 20 percent of companies which failed
employment and investment targets a significant share failed considerably: in 1993,
e.g., 40 percent of failing companies fell short of their employment commitments by-17-
more than n50 percent, and in respect to investment commitments the share was even
55 percent (Table 4).
Because of the lack of convincing criteria it is difficult to judge the performance of the
THA. Peter Friedrich (1994) rightly pointed out that the overall performance of the
THA must be seen as a compound of past and future performance. Consequently,
much will depend on the ongoing contract management of its successor organization,
the BVS. In cases, in which the THA has failed to reach its targets, Friedrich advocates
intensive re-negotiation and even taking back of companies and plants by the BVS.
From an economic point of view there might be good reasons for doing so. However,
there are no signs at all that the political parties as well as the populace in Germany
could be interested in opening up a new battlefield in the form of a second round of
privatization. As we can learn from public choice theory: if in political markets the op-
ponents are convinced that they have reached their equilibrium, then the distance be-
tween them will become small. Consequently, they will lose all their interest in
deploying further resources. One possible consequence of this decline in policy dis-
tance is that also the controller might find it advisable to pursue a strategy of ,,benign
neglect".
From this we have to conclude that the failures of privatization can only be corrected
by the markets. From an economist's point of view this is certainly a good solution.
One might hope that the political groups will accept the results and do not reject them.
Ill Conclusions: Lessons from Privatization
Compared to the troublesome experience in most transformation countries the THA
has written a success story. It has reached by and large its economic and social targets.
Economists might worry that the THA's strategy has accumulated too much economic
waste caused by social considerations. And politicians might lament that this strategy
implied that millions of people were ,,outplaced", ,,downsized" or ,,delayed" in the
name of privatization. Both might be right, but the THA was not an institution operat-
ing in an economic and political vacuum. It had to carefully balance polarized inter--18-
ests. In terms of the interaction of economics and politics its performance has not been
so far from the optimum. Its unpopularity has largely been a problem of success, not of
failure.
Among the lessons which have been learnt from the THA approach those are perhaps
the most important ones:
First: It is important to fix clear targets for privatization. The targets must be com-
patible. Allocation and distribution do not necessarily contradict each other,
but allocation should be given priority. Distribution must be the result of al-
location, not vice versa. In this respect, the THA was in a rather comfortable
position. It was able to operate without any distributive considerations.
In other respects the THA had much more trouble: it had a preference to push
companies into the private sector as quickly as possible, convinced that pri-
vate owners could restructure them more effectively than itself. But it suf-
fered from strong political pressure to restructure first and privatize later.
Fortunately, the THA found acceptable ways and means to avoid severe
conflicts.
The theory of economic policy suggests that a multiple target system also re-
quires a system of multiple means. For each target pursued a special means
should be available. The means for pursuing economic targets was privatiza-
tion, the means for pursuing social targets was a soft budget constraint. The
THA did not suffer from the task to distribute some thousands of companies
to millions of mini-shareholders neither able to invest additional money nor
to give management guidance to ,,their" company. In this respect its task was
much easier than the task of governments in transition countries.
Second: It must be clear which institution should be responsible for privatization. This
institution must be independent and free from political governance. The THA
had always been not only the locomotive that pulled the privatization train
but also the driver. Too many persons on the tender provoke long-standing
disputes. This must delay or even stop the train. In addition, the driver must-19-
be a strong personality able to stay on course and to keep the timetable. In
this respect the THA was benefiting from the courage, cleverness and reputa-
tion of its lady president.
Third: Public auctions are, in principle, the best means of privatization. They pro-
vide the best allocation of assets and, in this way, the best price. Normally,
they are less controversial than direct sales because the procedure guarantees
transparency and fairness. The THA did not have a great liking for auctions.
It preferred negotiations behind closed doors. From an economist's point of
view this seems to be hard to justify. However, given the deplorable state of
the majority of companies, it cannot be denied that public auctions would
have involved incalculable risks for the THA.
An interesting lesson from this is that wrong means do not necessarily pro-
duce a wrong outcome in terms of economic and political efficiency. In order
to operate successfully in a different political environment the THA's shield
was disinformation rather than information. Obviously, the THA's ,,closed-
door privatization" has satisfied optimal obfuscation better than any other
means of privatization.
Fourth: It is self-evident that a privatization agency which tends to purchase investors
must have a filled pocket. However, it should not operate without a budget
constraint. An unlimited budget encourages public spending by emphasizing
the benefits rather than the costs. Instead of talking about the future financial
burden of privatization, the THA preferred to speak of contracted employ-
ment or investment guarantees.
Fifth: Privatization must be kept off political battlefields. In this respect the THA
has been much more successful than governments in transition countries in-
cluding Poland (Lewandowski, 1994). Certainly, the THA had been able to
,,sugar the bill", and spending money is always a reliable social mollifier.
However, the masterpiece of the THA was its timing: it had completed most-20-
of its privatization program before political parties, in 1994, could start into
the super-election-year campaign.
Governments facing difficulties prefer a policy which might help temporarily at least:
they do nothing. By that, in borrowing a phrase from Richard Rose and Guy Peters
(1978), they hope to buy time. But buying time is costly and involves risks. The risk
that speedy privatization might lead to an inferior outcome is perhaps smaller than the
risk of doing nothing. Speed prevents politicians from reversal. The transformation
process must be a one-way route — without turnarounds.-21-
Annex:
The Markische Faser AG - A Case Study
Privatization
The Markische Faser AG, Premnitz (MF), formerly named VEB Chemiefaserwerk
,,Friedrich Engels", Premnitz, was one out of ten parts of the former VEB Chemie-
faserkombinat Schwarza ,,Wilhelm Pieck", Rudolstadt. As a company which employed
more than 6,000 people it belonged to the biggest producers of synthetic fibres in the
former GDR. In June 1990 it was transformed into an independent stock corporation.
In October 1990 the Treuhand steering committee recommended either a quick priva-
tization or a liquidation of the company. In November 1990 the MF presented a con-
cept for restructuring in which financial requirements in the range of 300 mill. DM
were estimated to be necessary in the period from 1991 to 1993. Nearly half of this
volume was assumed to be outside financing provided by the Treuhandanstalt. Em-
ployment should be reduced by 30 p.c. until the end of 1990 and by further 30 p.c.
until the end of 1991. Production should be focused on the core business, the product
range, however, should be renewed completely.
The THA attempted to acquire a big investor and approached leading West German
producers — Bayer and Akzo among them. Investment consultants were charged with
identifying other potential investors and a public invitation of tender was organized. In
addition, the MF managing board itself tried to establish contacts with potential inves-
tors, e.g. in Japan. All efforts, though, did not yield any final agreement, neither for the
company as a whole nor for any part of it.
In the process of reorganizing the MPs business activities two of its production units
were separated and sold individually: in February 1991, the Novoktan GmbH, a lim-
LeitungsausschuB, i.e. a group of external experts in charge of evaluating the enterprises
and advising the management board whether to continue or liquidate them.-22-
ited liability company with 2 mill. DM nominal capital and 220 employees, was sold
to the Alcor ChemieAG, a Swiss chemical producer, at a price of less than
1 mill. DM. In December 1991 the Aktivkohle und Umweltschutz GmbH (Activated
Carbon and Environmental Protection Ltd.) with 1 mill. DM nominal capital and
54 employees was sold to WBL Absorptionstechnik Holding AG at a price of
1 mill. DM.
In August 1991, the Treuhand steering committee insisted once again on its recom-
mendation: the MF should be sold quickly or liquidated. However, there was only one
seriously interested buyer, the Alcor Chemie AG, which bought the company in Octo-
ber 1991. The THA considered this deal to be problematic because Alcor's business
strategy for the MF was entirely based on exports into the CIS. However, this risk had
to be assessed against the outstanding regional importance of the MF for employment.
Finally, the contract with Alcor was concluded on the following terms: although the
assets in the opening balance had a volume of 400 mill. DM, the sales price was only
5 mill. DM and old debts of 175 mill. DM were released. Alcor promised to keep
1,990 jobs and to invest 100 mill. DM, thereof 60 mill. DM until the end of 1993 and
40 mill. DM until the end of 1995. Non-fulfilment of both the total investment guaran-
tee and 85 p.c. of the employment guarantee (1,700 jobs) was penalized. If real estate
was to be sold, Alcor would have to pay the THA 50 p.c. of the additional revenues. In
December 1991 the terms of contract, namely those concerning future investments,
were changed: until the end of 1993 at least 30 mill. DM had to be invested. Otherwise
the THA would have been entitled to cancel the entire contract without any obligation
to repay the expenditures. At that time, based on a Russian declaration to fulfil the
purchase contract with the MF, the THA assumed the privatization to be feasible.
Re-negotiation
Already in January 1992, the creditworthiness of the QS business partners worsened
perceptibly and subsequently, the MF found itself in a liquidity bottleneck. In April
1992 Alcor approached the THA demanding additional funds of 100 mill. DM. This
was justified, they argued, by a vital change in the circumstances which were assumed-23-
as the contract was concluded. In August 1992 Alcor increased its demand for addi-
tional funds up to 110-120 mill. DM. They should be assigned to clear up ecological
damages and to pay back liquidity credits. As the THA rejected, the MF managing
board decided in September 1992 to close the shop. In response, the employees occu-
pied the enterprise. By this, public attention was drawn to the case and the federal
government felt strong pressure to intervene.
At that point, the state of affairs was as follows: the THA had granted support of more
than 330 mill. DM, out of which 175 mill. DM were used to redeem old debts, the rest
mainly served to overcome liquidity bottlenecks. However, Alcor abstained from sup-
plying any liquidity to the MF and called for further support on part of the THA. Fi-
nally, the THA and the Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft Brandenburg repurchased at
equal shares MF real estate of the value of 25 mill. DM. In December 1992, the THA,
the state government of Brandenburg, Alcor and the MF jointly decided on a ,,minutes
of results" (Ergebnisprotokoll) to raise further funds by reselling non-essential parts of
MFs real estate to the THA. All in all, further 20 mill. DM were raised by this initia-
tive. In addition, the THA promised to grant consulting assistance. It commissioned a
commercial consultant to prepare an expertise. The outcome was that MFs survival
was crucially dependent on fundamental structural changes. This would have required
260 mill. DM only to continue the business and further 220 mill. DM to finance future
investments. Based on this expertise Alcor made subsequent claims of almost
300 mill. DM. In April 1993 the THA rejected these demands and called attention to
the volume of payments and concessions it had already made. In May 1993 Alcor in-
tended to withdraw further liquidity from the MF. The THA intervened and pointed
out that this would violate the contract. In June 1993 Alcor announced a further reduc-
tion of employment of the MF. The THA insisted that the employment guarantees had
to be kept. Otherwise it would enforce the payment of penalties.
For a longer time the fate of the MF is still undecided. Alcor, the owner of the MF,
wanted to get rid of it, but the THA was refusing to take the company back. There was
a new possible investor, Rostextil (Russia), who was interested in buying MF. But no
contract has been signed yet. According to reliable sources Rostextil was not willing to-24-
fulfil the employment guarantees contracted by Alcor. In September 1994 MF was
bought by the West NBL Beteiligungsholding GmbH, which belongs to the Westdeut-
sche Landesbank. However, the West NBL will manage the MF only temporarily and
is in search of an investor willing and able to restructure the company.-25-
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